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Abstract
In future, information may become one of the most important assets in economy. However,
unlike common goods (e.g. clothing), information is troublesome in trading since the information
commodities are vulnerable, as they lose their values immediately after revelation, and possibly
unverifiable, as they can be subjective. By authorizing a trusted center (e.g. Amazon) to help
manage the information trade, traders are “forced” to give the trusted center the ability to
become an information monopolist.
To this end, we need a trust-free (i.e. without a trusted center and with only strategic
traders) unverifiable information trade protocol such that it 1) motivates the sellers to provide
high quality information, and the buyer to pay for the information with a fair price (truthful); 2)
except the owner, the information is known only to its buyer if the trade is executed (secure).
In an unverifiable information trade scenario (e.g. a medical company wants to buy experts’
opinions on multiple difficult medical images with unknown pathological truth from several
hospitals), we design a trust-free, truthful, and secure protocol, Smart Info-Dealer (SMind) , for
information trading, by borrowing three cutting-edge tools that include peer prediction, secure
multi-party computation, and smart contract. With SMind, without a trusted center, a seller
with high-quality information is able to sell her information securely at a fair price and those
with low-quality information cannot earn extra money with poor information or steal information
from other sellers. We believe SMind will help describe a free and secure information trade
scenario in future.
1 Introduction
Nowadays people come to realize the importance of information assets. However, information
commodities differ from most entity goods substantially because information commodities lose their
values immediately after revelation. Customers can look around a clothing store before making their
purchases, while an information store should hide all information from the public, otherwise everyone
learns the information and no one will pay for it. However, without the chance to see the goods,
how can a buyer decide whether to pay for certain pieces of information as the way she shops in the
clothing store?
Moreover, even if a piece of information is disclosed, an information buyer would still be confused,
especially when it is unverifiable (e.g. subjective opinions). A costumer shopping her clothes can
make a purchase based on the style of the clothing, while the information buyer may have no clue
about the value of the disclosed information, which can be meaningless or even fake.
Furthermore, even if there exists a trusted center who is able to magically evaluate the quality
of the unverifiable information without revealing it to the buyer, traders are “forced” to authorize
this powerful center to access the information. A commonly-trusted information trading center may
gradually grow into an information monopolist, which has been observed in the cases of google,
Amazon etc. Also, dependency on a trusted center severely limits the trade of the information asset.
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Despite several challenges as mentioned above, information trading is prevalent in contemporary
world. A running example is that a medical company (the buyer) wants to buy labels (e.g. hard
labels like benign/malignant, or soft labels like 90% benign) for multiple difficult medical images with
unknown pathological truth from multiple hospitals (the sellers). To tackle the challenges discussed
above, we aim to design an information trade protocol for unverifiable information, which satisfies
the following three properties:
Trust-free a trusted center is not required, and every trader, including the hospitals and the
medical company, is rational/strategic rather than required to be honest
Truthful 1) each hospital (the seller) is incentivized to provide truthful and high-quality information,
i.e. labels for the medical images; 2) the medical company (the buyer) is incentivized to pay
the information with a fixed payment function;
Secure except the final trade price, each hospital cannot infer additional information about other
hospital’s information. The medical company can only obtain the information if and only if
the trade protocol is successfully executed.
A recent line of research, peer prediction (e.g.[24, 32, 13, 20, 33, 21]), focuses on designing
mechanisms that elicit truthful, but unverifiable information. Peer prediction mainly measures each
seller’s information quality based on her peer ’s reported information and pays for the measured
quality. In our running example of two hospitals A and B, the quality of their information is
measured according to the “similarity” between their labels. The “similarity” measure is carefully
designed such that the hospitals will be incentivized to report honestly and a hospital who reports
meaningless information (e.g. label randomly or always label benign) will obtain the lowest payment.
However, peer prediction does not ensure privacy of participants and implicitly requires a trusted
center to compute the “similarity” and to make the exchange of payment and information.
A cryptography protocol, secure multi-party computation (MPC [40, 18, 4, 5])1, allows us to
address the above security issue. MPC is a multi-party protocol such that the process of computation
reveals nothing beyond the output from the perspective of protocol participants. Thus, combined
with peer prediction, MPC allows sellers to compute the quality of the information without violating
privacy of each sellers. However, different from the traditional MPC scenario where a party can be
either honest or malicious, in our setting all parties are strategic.
Although MPC achieves privacy-preserving computation of information quality, i.e. the payment
of the information, the trust-free fair exchange of payment and information still has not been
guaranteed. This gives rise to new incentive issues. A recent work [15] proposes a smart contract
based solution for the trust-free fair exchange.
We borrow this smart contract based solution and combine with the other two cutting-edge tools,
peer prediction, MPC, to propose a trust-free, truthful, and secure information trade protocol for
unverifiable information, Smart Info-Dealer (SMind). In our running example with SMind which
does not require the existence of trusted center, the medical company is able to buy high-quality
information securely from high-quality hospitals at a fair price and a low-quality hospital cannot
earn money with poor information or steal other hiqh-quality hospitals’ information. Thus, in a new
world where the information becomes one of the most important assets in economy, we believe our
method will help describe a free and secure information trade scenario.
1MPC is the abbreviation of secure multi-party computation in standard cryptographic notion, we will use this
notion in the subsequent part of this paper.
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1.1 Road map
Section 2 discusses related work. Section 3 introduces basic game theory and cryptographic concepts
and also the main three building blocks of SMind. Section 4 formally introduces the information
trade setting, the protocol design goals and our protocol, SMind. Section 5 shows our main theorem:
SMind is trust-free, truthful, and secure. Section 6 shows a natural extension from 2-seller setting to
multiple sellers. In the end, Section 7 concludes by discussing the robustness and implementation of
SMind.
2 Related work
Decentralized prediction market With the bloom of researches on blockchain, decentralized
information trading platforms are developed on chain [31, 35, 1, 39], mostly addressing the decen-
tralization of prediction market. However, their settings are totally different from our work. The
prediction market is essentially an verifiable information trade platform and assumes that the ground
truth will be revealed in the future. Also, our work enables instant payment, while participants in
prediction market should wait for the truth to be revealed.
Peer prediction A recent line of research, peer prediction (e.g.[24, 32, 13, 20, 33, 21]), focuses on
designing mechanisms that elicit truthful, but unverifiable information. Unlike prediction market,
peer prediction does not assume the existence of ground truth. However, peer prediction does not
consider the security issue and implicitly requires a trusted center to compute the payment and to
transfer the payment and the information. Our work raises and addresses the security issues of peer
prediction.
Outsourced computation Works on outsourced computation aim to verify the correctness of
computation [37, 22, 14]. However, outsource computation addresses mostly on verifiable computation,
while our setting considers unverifiable information. Also, their works do not take into account
security issues and assume that there is a trusted judge for arbitration, while ours ensures privacy
and removes a trusted center from the trading.
Secure Multi-party Computation The notion of secure multi-party computation is first in-
troduced as an open problem by Yao in 1980s[40], and later there comes many protocols such as
[18, 4, 5], etc. Since 2000s building practical systems using general-purpose multi-party computation
becomes realistic due to algorithmic and computing improvements [23, 12, 28, 38]. MPC has been
applied to varies of areas, e.g. auction [6, 7], machine learning [26, 25] to address the security and
privacy issue. In the current paper, we apply MPC to a new field, eliciting unverifiable information,
to address the security issue. Works on strategic MPC introduce the notion of rational protocol
design in MPC [16, 19, 2]. Our protocol can also be considered under the strategic MPC setting. By
carefully designing economic rewards and punishments, the parties will be motivated to run MPC
truthfully. However, we consider an information trade setting which is totally different from previous
strategic MPC works.
Blockchain and smart contract Firstly proposed in Bitcoin [27], blockchain is built upon
consensus protocols, with security guaranteed by honest majority on chain [17, 34]. Ethereum [8] first
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realizes smart contract on blockchain. It can be defined as enforced agreements between distrusted
parties [11]. In recent works on fairly exchanging verifiable digital goods [36, 15], smart contract
works as a trusted third person to verify the incorrectness of trade process when needed. We borrow
this idea and combine with peer prediction, MPC to propose a truthful, secure, trust-free protocol
for the trade of unverifiable information.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Basic game theory topics: extensive form, subgame, strategy, equilibrium
concepts
Readers can refer to [29] for a detailed definition of basic game theory concepts.
A game consists of a list of players, a description of the players’ possible actions, a specification
of what the players know at their turn and a specification of the payoffs of players’ actions.
A node x in the extensive-form game defines a subgame if x and its successors are in an information
set that does not contain nodes that are not successors of x. A subgame is the tree structure initiated
by such a node x and its successors.
A strategy is a complete plan for a player in the game, which describes the actions that the player
would take at each of her possible decision points.
We define a strategy profile s as a profile of all agents’ strategies (s1, s2, ..., sn). Agents play s if
for all i, agent i plays strategy si.
A (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium (B(NE)) consists of a strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) such that
no agent wishes to change her strategy since other strategies will decrease her expected payment,
given the strategies of the other agents and the information contained in her prior and her signal.
A strategy profile is a strong Nash equilibrium if it represents a Nash equilibrium in which no
coalition, taking the actions of its complements as given, can cooperatively deviate in a way that
benefits all of its members.
A strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) if it represents a Nash equilibrium of
every subgame of the original game.
Definition 3.1 (Strong Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (Strong SPE)). A strategy profile is a strong
subgame perfect equilibrium if it is a SPE and a strong NE.
Backward induction procedure is the process of analyzing a game from the end to the beginning.
At each decision node, one strikes from consideration any actions that are dominated, given the
terminal nodes that can be reached through the play of the actions identified at successor nodes.
3.2 Cryptographic Building Blocks
3.2.1 Basic cryptographic tools
Definition 3.2 (Encryption Scheme). A encryption scheme is a tuple (Gen,Enc,Dec) that
key generation: having a security parameter n, generates a key k ← Gen(1κ)
4
encryption: Upon input a message m and key k, output a ciphertext c← Enck(m)
decryption: Upon input a ciphertext c and key k, outputs a message m← Deck(c)
Definition 3.3 (Commitment Scheme). A commitment scheme is a two-party protocol between
sender and a receiver. In the first phase, the sender commits to some value m and sends the
commitment to the receiver; in the second phase, the sender can open the commitment by revealing
m and some auxiliary information to the receiver, which the receiver will use to verify that the value
he received is indeed the value the sender committed to during the first phase.
A commitment scheme is often defined as follows:
Commit: To commit to a message m, the sender choose randomness Op2, and generates the
commitment by Com(m)← Commit(Op,m). The sender sends Com to receiver.
Open: To open a commitment, the sender sends m and Op to receiver. Receiver computes checkbit←
Open(Com,Op,m). If checkbit is valid, then the receiver accepts that this message m is indeed
the message that the sender previously committed to. Otherwise she rejects.
A commitment scheme should satisfy the following two properties:
Hiding: Given the commitment Com(m) of a message m, the receiver should not learn anything
about m.
Binding: Given the commitment Com(m) of a message m, the sender should only be able to open
the commitment without changing the messages.
3.2.2 Cryptographic protocol
Definition 3.4 (Secure Multi-party Computation). [10] Secure multi-party computation (MPC)
allows n distrust parties to jointly compute an agreed-upon function of their private inputs without
revealing anything beyond the output.
When executing a MPC protocol, parties communicate with each other (receiving messages and
sending messages) as well as do some local computation, and they will obtain the output of the
agreed-upon function after multiple rounds.
Informally, A MPC protocol is secure if participants cannot infer other party’s input through
inspecting the list of messages she sees during the execution3. The formalization of the above
intuition is real world/ideal world paradigm [18].
Definition 3.5 (Real World/Ideal World Paradigm). The security of cryptographic protocol is
formalized through the notion of comparison.
Real world: the parties execute a prescribed protocol
Ideal world: there is a trusted agent with complete privacy guarantee, and each party sends their
inputs to this trusted agent and the trusted agent computes the agreed-upon function, and then
sends the output back to each party
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Figure 1: Real world/ideal world paradigm
With Definition 3.5, a MPC protocol is secure if the scenario where parties executing the protocol
is as secure as the scenario where parties has a trusted agent. The formalized notion of this is
simulation. We defer the detailed description of simulation to appendix.
Lemma 3.6. [18] There exists a secure multi-party computation protocol.
3.3 Peer prediction
In the setting where information cannot be verified (e.g. subjective opinions, labels of medical images
without known pathological truth), peer prediction focuses on designing reward schemes that help
incentivize truthful, high quality information. In the peer prediction style information elicitation
mechanisms, each information provider’s reward only depends on her report and her peers’ reports.
Our SMind uses two special peer prediction mechanisms as building blocks that are proposed by
Shnayder et al. [33], Kong and Schoenebeck [20], Kong and Schoenebeck [21]. We believe that using
other peer prediction mechanisms as building blocks is similar to our case. The information theoretic
idea proposed by Kong and Schoenebeck [20] can give a simple interpretation to the two special peer
prediction mechanisms. At a high level, each information provider is paid the unbiased estimator of
the “mutual information”, call it mutual information gain (MIG), between her reported information
and her peer’s reported information where the “mutual information” is information-monotone—any
“data processing” on the two random variables will decrease the “mutual information” between them.
Thus, to get highest payment, the information provider should tell the truth, since the truthful
information contains the most amount of information when applying non-truthful strategy can be
seen as a “data processing”. In our running example, a peer prediction style mechanism pays each
hospital the “mutual information” between her labels and her peer’s labels.
We start to introduce the two special multi-task setting (the number of tasks must be ≥ 2)
peer prediction mechanisms. One is Correlation PP, which elicits discrete signals (e.g. hard label:
benign/malignant) and the other is Pearson PP, which elicits forecasts (e.g. soft label: 70% benign,
30% malignant).
Correlation-PP/Pearson-PP Alice and Bob are assigned N ≥ 2 priori similar questions (e.g.
medical image labeling questions).
2The detail of this step depends on concrete construction, we only provide high-level description here.
3For simplicity, we omit cryptographic definition details here, and we will discuss them rigorously in appendix.
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Report for each question i, Alice is asked to report riA and Bob is asked to report r
i
B. We denote
Alice and Bob’s honest report for all questions by rA and rB respectively and denote their
actual reports by r⋀A and r
⋀
B.
Payment Alice and Bob are rewarded by the average “the amount of agreement” between their
reports in same task, and punished the average “the amount of agreement” between their
reports in distinct tasks. When their reports are discrete signals, they are paid
MIGCorr(r⋀A, r⋀B) = 1
N
∑
i
(1(r⋀iA == r⋀iB)) (1)
− 1
N(N − 1)∑i≠j (1(r⋀iA == r⋀jB))
When their reports are forecasts, given the prior distribution Pr[Y ] (e.g. the apriori prediction
of benign/malignant, like 90% benign/10% malignant), they are paid
MIGPearson(r⋀A, r⋀B) = 1
N
∑
i
2(∑
y∈Σ
r
⋀i
A(y)r⋀iB(y)
Pr[Y = y] − 1) (2)
− 1
N(N − 1)∑i≠j ⎛⎝(∑y∈Σ r
⋀i
A(y)r⋀jB(y)
Pr[Y = y] )2 − 1⎞⎠
Assumption 3.7 (A priori similar and random order). All questions have the same prior. All
questions appear in a random order, independently drawn for both Alice and Bob.
Alice and Bob play a truthful strategy profile if they report (r⋀A, r⋀B) = (rA, rB). Informally,
Alice and Bob play a permutation strategy profile if they both report the same permutation of their
honest reports. (e.g. hard label case: label benign when it’s malignant and say malignant when it’s
benign; soft label case: their honest forecasts are 70% benign, 30 % malignant and 65% benign, 35%
malignant but they instead report 30% benign, 70 % malignant and 35% benign, 65% malignant).
Here we omit the formal definition of permutation strategy profile as well as the introductions of
other additional assumptions required by Correlation-PP and Pearson-PP since they are not the
focus of this paper. Interested readers are referred to Shnayder et al. [33], Kong and Schoenebeck
[20], Kong and Schoenebeck [21]. We present the main property of Correlation-PP/Pearson-PP,
i.e., both MIGCorr(r⋀A, r⋀B) and MIGPearson(r⋀A, r⋀B) are maximized if (r⋀A, r⋀B) = (rA, rB) and the
maximum is always strictly positive, such that the sellers are willing to participate the game at the
beginning.
Lemma 3.8 (Correlation-PP/Pearson-PP is truthful). [33, 20, 21] With a priori similar and random
order assumption, and mild conditions on the prior, Correlation-PP/Pearson-PP has truth-telling
is a strict equilibrium and each agent’s expected payment is strictly maximized when agents tell the
truth, where the maximum is also strictly positive. Moreover, when agents play a non-permutation
strategy profile, each agent’s expected payment is strictly less than truth-telling.
3.4 Smart contract
Smart contract enforces the execution of a contract between untrusted parties. It allows credible
and irreversible transactions without a trusted third party. The assurance is based on the consensus
protocol of blockchain.
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In the most prominent smart-contract platform Ethereum, contract codes resides on the blockchain,
executed on a decentralized virtual machine Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). Each instruction in
a smart contract is ideally executed by all miners on the chain. Transaction fees provide economic
incentives for miners to execute the contract, who pack transactions into blocks and record them on
chain.
It has been shown that without further assumption it is impossible to design protocols that
guarantees complete fairness in exchange procedure without a trusted third party [18, 30, 40]. The
reliability of blockchain is ensured by honest majority on chain. In our protocol, smart contract
provides support for the following functionalities:
Ledger A contract with id stores ledger-needed information. It runs with multiple parties, stores
their balance and frozen funds in the contract.
Freeze Funds It should be able to freeze funds from accounts onto chain.
Unfreeze Funds It should be able to unfreeze funds from the previously frozen to accounts in the
contract.
For simplicity, we do not elaborate on the functionalities of smart contract in our protocol.
Instead, it is taken as a public bulletin board with code running on it.
4 SMind: A Trust-free, Truthful, and Secure Information Trade
Protocol
In this section, we introduce our Smart Info-Dealer (SMind), a trust-free, truthful, and secure
protocol that elicits unverifiable information. We first focus on the information trade setting where
there are one buyer vs two sellers and will extend the setting to multiple sellers later.
We recall our example of medical image labeling here and recommend the readers use this running
example as a background when they read this section: a medical company (the buyer) wants to buy
labels (hard label: benign/malignant, soft label: 90% benign) for multiple difficult medical images
with unknown pathological truth from two hospitals (the sellers).
We start by formally introducing the information trade setting and the definition of information
trade protocol (Section 4.1). Then we will present three protocol design goals: trust-free, truthful,
and secure (see informal definitions in Section 1). Figure 2 shows an overview of SMind. Finally,
we will present the pseudosode of SMind (Section 4.3) and show that it is trust-free, truthful, and
secure (Section 5).
4.1 Model and setting
Information trade setting (B,S1,S2,N) A buyer B wants to buy two sellers’ information
(denoted as S1,S2), for N (N > 1) a priori similar events/questions q1, q2, ..., qN (e.g. labeling medical
images). The opinion format may be a discrete signal (e.g hard label: benign/malignant) in Σ or
a forecast (e.g. soft label: 70% benign, 30% malignant) in ∆Σ, where ∆Σ is the set of all possible
distributions over Σ, for the possible outcome of the event. We denote the honest private opinions of
the two sellers by (r1, r2) respectively and their actual reported opinions by (r⋀1, r⋀2) respectively.
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Figure 2: An illustration of SMind: A buyer (e.g. medical company) wants to buy two sellers’ private
opinions info1, info2 on several a priori similar tasks (e.g. soft or hard labels for several difficult
medical images), with a fixed payment function PayFunc(info1, info2) (e.g. a peer prediction style
payment). 1) Sign Smart Contract: the buyers and sellers first sign the smart contract, submit
the payment function, and pay their deposits (we omit this step in the figure). 2) Assign Questions
(red): the buyer assigns questions to the sellers privately in random order pi1 and pi2, and then
commits to the question sets pii(Q) (each seller checks) for possible future Rebuttal stage. 3) Submit
Answers (yellow): the sellers answer the questions individually. After they finish the questions,
they package all information (include questions, answers) and send the encrypted info (by info-key)
to the buyer and commit to info-keys and sends the commitment to smart contract. The sellers also
commit to their encrypted info (buyer checks) and send the commitment to the smart contract for
possible future Rebuttal stage. 4) Compute Payment Function (yellow): the sellers run MPC
to compute the payment function and sends MPC’s output individually to the public. 5) Open
and Check Goods (red): the sellers reveal their info-keys to the public. The buyer opens and
checks the good. If the good is incorrect (wrong questions, or payment computation), then the buyer
raises rebuttal. 6) Transaction or Rebuttal (blue): if the buyer does not raise rebuttal, the
smart contract makes transaction. Otherwise, the smart contract runs the rebuttal protocol with
the information that is committed previously.
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We call the buyer and sellers traders. Each trader has a privacy cost. Each seller’s privacy cost
PriCostSi represents her cost when she knows her private information is revealed to other people
besides the buyer who pays. The buyer’s privacy cost PriCostB represents her cost when her
bought information is revealed to other people (e.g.the public) besides the information owner.
Definition 4.1 (Information Trade Protocol (ITP)). Given a setting (B,S1,S2,N), an information
trade protocol is a protocol that allows the buyer B to buys two sellers’ opinions (r⋀1, r⋀2) with a fixed
payment function PayFunc(r⋀1, r⋀2).
4.2 Protocol design goals: trust-free, truthful, and secure
We first give the formal definitions of trust-free and truthful ITPs.
Definition 4.2 (Trust-free ITP). An ITP is trust-free if its execution does not need to assume that
any trader is honest nor the existence of a trusted center.
In a trust-free ITP, the traders are allowed to be rational/strategic instead of required to be
honest. To encourage the rational traders to behave honestly, a truth-free ITP should be additionally
truthful, which definition will be introduced now.
Traders play truthful strategy in ITP if they follow ITP honestly. At a high level, truthful sellers
provide truthful information and truthful buyers pay the information with a fixed payment function.
If there exists an equilibrium concept such that the ITP has truth-telling as the only equilibrium
satisfying that equilibrium concept, we are convinced to say the traders will be encouraged to follow
the ITP honestly, i.e. the ITP is truthful. We pick strong SPE (Definition 3.1) as the equilibrium
concept.
Definition 4.3 (Truthful ITP). An ITP is truthful if it has truth-telling as the only strong SPE.
We give an informal definition of security here and will give a formal real world/ideal world style
(see Definition 3.5) definition in appendix.
Definition 4.4 (Secure ITP (informal)). An ITP is secure if the information is only revealed to its
owner and its buyer when traders follow the protocol. Except the output of the payment function,
it’s computationally infeasible for other people to obtain additional information, except a negligible
probability.
4.3 SMind: description, assumptions, properties
We give the pseudocode of our SMind here (Table 1, 2). In the pseudocode, we use Op(m) to denote
the committed message m’s opening, but this does not mean Op(m) depends on m, instead, it is
chosen before generating the commitment of m.
We present several reasonable assumptions of our main theorem.
Assumption 4.5. Initially, sellers do not know each other’s identity.
This assumption guarantees that the sellers cannot privately communicate with each other before
the Compute Payment Function stage. We require this assumption to guarantee the truthful property
of the peer prediction building block of SMind. Since without this assumption, 1) the sellers will
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Table 1: SMind (Part I)
Sign Smart Contract
Buyer and two sellers, B,S1,S2:
1. determines and submits PayFunc(rˆ1, rˆ2) ∶= αMIG(rˆ1, rˆ2) + β a
a. selects the coefficients α > 0, β > 0 of the payment function
b. submits the coefficients to smart contract
c. submits the MIG function to smart contract
2. pays their deposits DepB,DepS1 ,DepS2 respectively to the contract
Assign Questions
Buyer B:
1. shuffles
a. randomly selects two permutations pi1, pi2 (a.k.a question order)
b. generates two permuted question sets to get pi1(Q), pi2(Q)
2. commits
a. commits to pii(Q): generates randomness Op(pii(Q)),
generates the commitments Com(pii(Q))← Commit(Op(pii(Q)), pii(Q))
b. submits the two commitments Com(pi1(Q)),Com(pi2(Q)) to smart contract
2. waiting to be checked
sends pii(Q),Op(pii(Q)) to seller i.
Each Seller Si:
checks the buyer’s commitments
checkbit← Open(Com(pii(Q)),Op(pii(Q)), pii(Q))
if checkbit is valid, then goto Submit Answers
else terminates
Submit Answers
Each seller Si:
1. packages and encrypts
a. packages her (pii(Q), answers) as her infoi
b. generates info-keyi, encrypts infoi with info-key to get Encinfo-key1(infoi)
2. commits
a. commits to Encinfo-keyi(infoi):
generates randomness Op(Encinfo-keyi(infoi))
generates the commitment
Com(Encinfo-keyi(infoi))← Commit(Op(Encinfo-keyi(infoi)),Encinfo-keyi(infoi))
b. commits to info-keyi:
generates randomness Op(info-keyi)
generates the commitment Com(info-keyi)← Commit(Op(info-keyi), info-keyi)
c. submits Com(Encinfo-keyi(infoi)) and Com(info-keyi) to smart contract
3. waiting to be checked
sends Encinfo-keyi(infoi) and Op(Encinfo-keyi(infoi)) to buyer
Buyer B:
checks the sellers’ commitments
checkbit← Open(Com(Encinfo-keyi(infoi)),Op(Encinfo-keyi(infoi)),Encinfo-keyi(infoi))
if checkbit is valid, then goto Compute Payment Function
else terminates
aThe traders can pick MIG as MIGPearson or MIGCorr based on the format of the opinions (Section 3.3).
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Table 2: SMind (Part II)
Compute Payment Function
Two sellers S1,S2:
1. run MPC sub-protocol to compute the PayFunc(rˆ1, rˆ2)
2. submit output individually to smart contract
Open and Check Goods
Each seller Si:
submits info-keyi and Op(info-keyi) to smart contract
Buyer B:
checks:
use info-keyi to decrypt Encinfo-keyi(infoi)
if fail in decryption
or questions in infoi does not match pii(Q)
or PayFunc is inconsistent as reported
raises Rebuttal
Smart contract SC:
1. waits for submission
if receives info-keyis and consistent MPC outputs before time-out
goto next step
else
confises all sellers’ deposits, return buyer’s deposits and terminates
2. checks
checkbit← Open(Com(info-keyi),Op(info-keyi), info-keyi)
if checkbit is invalid
all deposits goes to buyer, terminates
3. makes transaction
if not receives Rebuttal (a.k.a time-out)
make transactions and terminates
Rebuttal
Buyer B:
submits Encinfo-keyi(infoi), Op(Encinfo-keyi(infoi)); pii(Q) and Op(pii(Q)), i = 1,2
Smart contract SC:
if not receives buyer’s submissions (a.k.a. time-out)
goto rebuttal failure
checkbit1 ← Open(Com(Encinfo-keyi(infoi)),Op(Encinfo-keyi(infoi)),Encinfo-keyi(infoi))
checkbit2 ← Open(Com(pii(Q)),Op(pii(Q)), pii(Q))
if checkbit1 or checkbit2 is invalid, then goto rebuttal failure
if fail in decryption
or questions in infoi does not match pii(Q)
or PayFunc is inconsistent as reported
goto rebuttal success
rebuttal failure: gives all deposits evenly to the sellers except the contract cost
rebuttal success: gives all deposits to the buyer except the contract cost
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play an order collusion (e.g. answer yes/no for the questions with even/odd index) to get higher
payments; 2) although permutation (e.g. label benign when it is malignant, label malignant when it
is benign) cannot bring the sellers strictly higher payments (Lemma 3.8), a permutation strategy
profile is much less risky when the above assumption does not hold.
The above assumption still allows the sellers to privately communicate with each other in the
Compute Payment Function stage, since before this stage, the protocol has already asked the sellers
to commit several necessary information securely for future possible Rebuttal stage.
Assumption 4.6. Traders cannot transfer money after the protocol, aided by a trusted judge outside
the protocol.
It may sound possible that the buyer can collude with one seller to cheat for all deposits and
divide them evenly after the protocol. However, it implicitly requires a trusted judge to execute this,
otherwise buyers will take all money and refuse to give her accomplice.
To encourage the sellers to run MPC rather than calculate the payment in a non-private way
(e.g. seller 1 sends her private information to seller 2 and seller 2 finishes all computations) in the
Compute Payment Function stage, we need the following assumption.
Assumption 4.7. Both sellers have privacy costs that are greater than the cost of running MPC.
However, this assumption is not necessary if we do not care the computation method the sellers
use, since all other parts (e.g. payment submission) in SMind are still truthful and secure without
this assumption.
Theorem 4.8 (Main Theorem). With assumption 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, there exists proper deposits such
that SMind is trust-free, truthful, and secure.
5 Proof of Main Theorem
We recommend the readers to use Figure 2 as a reference when reading the proof. The trust-free
property of SMind follows from its description. We show the truthful property and the secure
property independently.
To show SMind is truthful, i.e. has truth-telling as the unique strong SPE, we use backward
induction procedure (Section 3.1) and start from the last stage. We will firstly show that when
deposits are large enough, the rational buyer will raise rebuttal as the protocol states. We then
prove that the sellers’ optimal strategy is to compute payment function for their committed answers
and report val1 = val2 = PayFunc(r⋀1, r⋀2) accordingly. Then we show that it is optimal for sellers to
package and hash their honest answers (r1, r2), due to the truthful property of the peer prediction
style payment functions. Finally to the first stage when questions are assigned, we show that the
rational buyer will follow the protocol honestly.
The security of SMind is based on security assumptions of its cryptographic building blocks
including encryption, hash, commitment scheme and MPC. We only provide an intuition of proof
here. For formal proof of security, readers can refer to Appendix B.
5.1 Truthfulness proof: game theoretic analysis
We start to show that with proper deposits, SMind has truth-telling as the unique strong SPE.
We first list the possible costs in SMind: contract cost: ConCost/trader, additional rebuttal
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cost: RebCost, privacy cost: PriCosttrader, MPC cost: MPCCost/seller, (lower-bound) cost of
attacking cryptographic building blocks: AttackCost. Note that the AttackCost is too large for
a trader to ever try on a real attack.
We identify SPE via a backward induction procedure: start from the last step, transactions or
rebuttal.
5.1.1 Transactions or Rebuttal
We first show that when the deposits are sufficiently large, the buyer’s optimal strategy is to follow
the protocol in the Open and Check Goods stage.
Definition 5.1 (Incorrect good). The information good is incorrect × if either of the following
situations is true:
info-keys × : the revealed info-keys fail to open the encrypted info
questions × : the questions set in the opened info is inconsistent with the committed questions set
payment computation × : the payment of the opened info is inconsistent with the value two
sellers submitted.
Lemma 5.2 (Optimal strategy in transaction or rebuttal: × → rebuttal,√ → no rebuttal). There
exists proper deposits, in detail,
DepS1 +DepS2 > RebCost +PriCostB − val + 2ConCost
and
DepB > val +ConCost −PriCostB AttackCost > DepS1 +DepS2 +DepB
such that after buyer opens and checks the information, it’s optimal for the buyer to raise rebuttal
when the good is incorrect and not raise rebuttal when the good is correct.
Proof. We first claim that that the smart contract is able to open and check the goods with previously
committed information, unless the buyer breaks the binding property of the commitment scheme.
Claim 5.3. In the Rebuttal stage, 1) if the good is incorrect, the buyer will win; 2) if the good is
correct, the buyer will lose unless she spends AttackCost to break the binding property of the
commitment scheme.
Before the Rebuttal stage, the encrypted information, the key, the questions are all committed
to the public (Figure 2). If the good is incorrect, the buyer can share her view with the public
by submitting the truthful encrypted information, such that the public can also know the good is
incorrect. If the good is correct, the buyer will lose unless she breaks the binding property of the
commitment scheme and submits a fake encrypted information. Thus, the above claim is valid.
We start to show that the buyer’s optimal strategy is × → rebuttal,√ → no rebuttal via the
following utility table, Table 3.
No rebuttal will always i) transfer val from the buyer to the seller, ii) take the contract cost from
the buyer.
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If the good is wrong, rebuttal will i) return the buyer her own deposit except the contract cost,
ii) bring the buyer all sellers’ deposits except the contract costs, iii) take the buyer the rebuttal cost
and her privacy cost.
If the good is correct, if the buyer does not attack the commitment scheme, the rebuttal will
i) take the buyer’s deposit and ii) her privacy cost; otherwise the buyer will obtain the rebuttal
benefits but lose the large attack cost.
Table 3: To rebuttal or not rebuttal?
Rebuttal no Rebuttal× RB ∶= DepS1 +DepS2 −RebCost −PriCostB − 3ConCost −val −ConCost√ −DepB −PriCostB or ≤ −AttackCost +RB −val −ConCost
The above table implies a proper deposits exist for the claim since the attack cost is very
large.
5.1.2 Compute Payment Function
We move backward to Compute Payment Function stage and show that there exists proper deposits
such that it is optimal for the sellers to honestly report PayFunc(rˆ1, rˆ2), given that (rˆ1, rˆ2) are the
answers the sellers committed in the previous Submit Answers stage.
Lemma 5.4 (Optimal strategy in Compute Payment Function stage: report PayFunc(rˆ1, rˆ2)).
Given that the buyer plays rationally in Transaction or Rebuttal stage, there exists proper deposits
such that, it is optimal for both of the sellers to report val1 = val2 = PayFunc(rˆ1, rˆ2) and to reveal
keys honestly, given that (rˆ1, rˆ2) are the answers the sellers committed in the previous Submit Answers
stage.
Moreover, if both the sellers’ privacy costs are greater than the MPC cost, i.e.,
PriCostSi >MPCCost, i = 1,2
it’s optimal for the sellers to run MPC to calculate the payment function.
Proof. We first note that although the sellers can communicate with each other in this stage, they
have no choice other than to compute the value of their committed data, report the value and reveal
the keys honestly, otherwise they will lose either 1) large attack cost (much larger than the highest
payment they can obtain in SMind) for breaking the commitment scheme, or 2) all their deposits in
rebuttal, given that the buyer plays rationally in Transaction or Rebuttal stage.
Moreover, if both the sellers’ privacy costs are greater than the MPC cost, i.e., PriCostSi >
MPCCost, i = 1,2, then it’s optimal for the sellers to run MPC to calculate the payment function,
otherwise although they may save the MPC cost, at least one of them will lose her privacy cost.
5.1.3 Submit Answers
We move back to the Submit Answers stage and will show that it’s optimal for the sellers to package
r1, r2 as their answers and encrypt and report the hash honestly.
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Lemma 5.5 (Optimal strategy in Submit Answers stage: package r1, r2 as answers). In the Submit
Answers stage, given that all traders will play rationally in the following stages, it is optimal for both
of the sellers to 1) package r1, r2 as their answers and 2) encrypt all info (include questions set and
answers) honestly; 3) commit the encrypted info honestly. It’s also optimal for the buyer to check the
sellers’ commitments honestly.
Proof. We start from the last step of this stage, the buyer checks the sellers’ commitments. At
this stage, the buyer cannot infer the private information (shown in the security proof). Thus, the
rational buyer will check the commitment of encrypted information honestly i.e. the buyer will agree
when it is correct (otherwise, the buyer loses the chance to buy the information) and disagree when
it is wrong (otherwise, the buyer will lose in the Rebuttal stage).
We move backward to the sellers’ parts: the information package and encrypted information
commitment part. Given that all traders will behave rationally later (Lemma 5.2, 5.4), at this stage,
the sellers must pick optimal (rˆ1, rˆ2) to maximize val = PayFunc(rˆ1, rˆ2).
Lemma 3.8 shows that when the buyer assigns questions in a random order, PayFunc(rˆ1, rˆ2) is
maximized when (rˆ1, rˆ2) = (r1, r2) and strictly maximized when there exists a permutation, such
that (rˆ1, rˆ2) is a permutation (r1, r2). Note that Assumption 4.5 guarantees that the sellers cannot
communicate privately when they answer the questions and the sellers will prefer answer truthfully
if the permutation strategy profile cannot bring them strictly more payments. Moreover, the hiding
property of commitment scheme guarantees that the sellers cannot infer each other’s order by public
commitments of pi1(Q) and pi2(Q).
Thus, it’s optimal for the sellers to pick (rˆ1, rˆ2) = (r1, r2) to maximize their payments val.
Finally, we show that the sellers should package, encrypt and commit honestly. If the sellers do not
package, encrypt and commit honestly, then it will either hurt the buyer or the sellers as SMind is
almost a zero-sum game for the buyer and the sellers group. Rational seller will not hurt themselves
and when it hurts the buyer, the rational buyers will disagree with the seller such that the sellers
lose the chance to sell their information. Therefore, the rational sellers should package, encrypt and
commit honestly.
5.1.4 Assign Questions
We move back to the initial stage, assign questions and will show that it is optimal for the buyer to
follow the protocol honestly here.
Lemma 5.6 (Optimal strategy in Assign Questions stage: truthful strategy). In the Assign Questions
stage, given that all traders will play rationally in the following stages, there exists proper deposits
such that it is optimal for the buyer to follow the protocol honestly in this stage.
Proof. We start from the last step of the Assign Questions stage, the sellers check the correctness of
committed questions Com(pi1(Q)) and Com(pi2(Q)). If they ignore the inconsistency between their
questions and the commitments, then they will lose their deposits in rebuttal. If they wrongly
disagree with the correct commitments, the contract will be rescinded, then they will waste ConCost
and lose the chance to sell their information. Therefore, with sufficiently large deposits, the rational
sellers will check the committed questions honestly.
When the buyer behave dishonestly in the Assign Question stage, it is possible that 1) the
buyer does not commit properly, i.e. apply the incorrect commitment scheme or apply the correct
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commitment scheme but commit the wrong questions; 2) the buyer does not assign the questions set
properly, for instance, not in a random order.
Both of the cases will either hurt the buyer or the seller, since by thinking the sellers as an unit,
SMind is almost a zero-sum game. Rational buyer will not hurt herself and if it hurts the seller,
then the rational seller will disagree for this commitment. Thus it is optimal for the buyer to follow
the protocol honestly in the Assign Questions stage.
After the above analysis, We are ready to finish our truthfulness proof. First we can see truth-
telling is a SPE, but not a unique SPE since the sellers report the same but wrong value in the
Compute Payment Function stage can also consist of a “bad” SPE. However, we note that these
“bad” SPEs are not strong NE since the sellers can together deviate to the truthful strategy profile
to benefit both of them. Thus, truth-telling is the unique strong SPE here.
5.2 Security proof: cryptographic analysis
In this section, we prove that honest-but-curious participants who follow the protocol cannot learn
additional information from the other traders.
Security against buyer Security against buyer means that buyer should not learn additional
information about seller’s data before the sellers reveal the keys. Note that before revealing
the keys, the buyer only has the encryption of the private information and the commitment of
the keys. Then, based on the security of the encryption scheme and the hiding property of the
commitment, SMind has security against buyer.
Security against seller Security against seller means that a seller should not learn additional
information about other seller’s data (answers) during the whole protocol. From the security
of MPC, a seller cannot learn any additional information of other seller’s input by inspecting
the communication transcript (messages being sent and received by a single seller during the
MPC). From the hiding property of commitment scheme, a seller cannot infer any additional
information of the ciphertext of other seller’s input (after she gets the decryption key, she
cannot get other seller’s input anyway).
Security against public It means that the public should not learn information except the value
of PayFunc submitted to the smart contract. After the keys are revealed, they cannot infer
additional information anyway. They can only see the commitment of encrypted data. From
the hiding property of commitment scheme, the public does not know the exact value of
encrypted data.
6 Extension to multiple sellers
This section introduces a natural extension of SMind to the setting where there are multiple sellers.
There are only two main differences. One is the payment function for each seller, and the other is
the output of MPC protocol.
We use r⋀−i to denote the set of all sellers’ answers excluding seller i. In the information trade
setting with multiple sellers, the buyer pays each seller i for
17
PayFunc(r⋀i; r⋀−i) ∶= α ∑
j,j≠iMIG(r⋀i, r⋀j) + β
Then, in the Compute Payment Function stage, all sellers run MPC protocol to output a payment
vector val such that val(i) = PayFunc(r⋀i; r⋀−i). If all sellers cannot reach an agreement on the
payment vector, then their deposits are taken. Once they reach an agreement, they can reach the
Transaction or Rebutal stage, like the two sellers’ version.
By going through all proofs carefully, this multiple sellers version SMind is still trust-free, truthful,
and secure.
Compared with the two sellers version, the multiple sellers version SMind is more desirable in
applications, due to the diversity in the payments. If there are three sellers, two high-quality, one
low-quality, then the low-quality seller will be paid poorly since she has poor correlation with both
other sellers, while the high-quality seller will be paid fairly since she has high correlation with
another high-quality seller. Moreover, the low-quality seller cannot get other high-quality sellers’
information, due to the security of SMind.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
In an unverifiable information trade scenario, we propose a trust-free, truthful, and secure information
trade protocol, SMind, by borrowing three cutting-edge tools that include peer prediction, secure
multi-party computation, and smart contract.
A limitation of SMind is the lack of robustness. For simplicity of the game theoretic analysis, we
let the sellers play a coordination game in the Compute Payment Function stage. However, if one of
the sellers is irrational, this will lead to bad results for all sellers. One future direction is to design
the protocol more delicately to make it robust.
Another direct future work is to implement our protocol in smart contract to allow unverifiable
information trade in different scenarios, for instance, the data trade in machine learning scenario.
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A Cryptographic building blocks
A.1 Programmable Global Random Oracle
In our proof, we use a restricted programmable and obeservable global random oracle, a model of
a perfect hash function returning uniformly random values. All parties in the protocol can query
the global random oracle. Following the works of [9, 15], we are able to use encryption scheme and
commitment scheme with this random oracle in our protocol. Figure 4 shows the ideal functionalities
of the random oracle.
Table 4: The ideal functionality of restricted programmable and observable random oracle, denoted
as H.
Parameter: output size µ
Variable: initially empty lists L, P storing queries and programmed queries, respectively,
and a list LA storing illegitimate queries made by the adversary.
1. Query:
Upon receiving a query with (query, q, id) from party of session id′:
if (q, r, id) ∈ L, respond with r.
if (q, id) ∉ L, sample r ∈ {0,1}µ, store (q, r, id) in L, and respond with r.
if id ≠ id′, store (q, r) in LA, respond with r
2. Program:
Upon receiving a program instruction (program, q, r, id) from the adversary A:
if (q, r, id) ∈ L, abort.
else, store (q, r, id) in L and (q, id) in P
Upon receiving (isProgrammed, q) from a party of session id:
if (q, id) ∈ P , respond with 1
else respond with 0
3. Observe:
Upon receiving (observe) from the adversary, respond with LA.
The programmability of global random oracle provides a strong power for the simulator in proof.
It enables the simulator to send the buyer a garbage encryption or a garbage commitment without
knowing the real encrypted or committed message and then program the random oracle to decrypt or
open the previous garbage encryption or commitment to the real message afterwards when the real
message is revealed (see details in [15]). We will employ this property of programmbility several times
in the future security proof. Note that the simulator can succeed except with negligible probability.
A.2 Encryption Scheme
We firstly define the security of a encryption scheme (IND-CPA secure), and then give a secure
encryption algorithm.
Intuitively speaking, IND-CPA secure symmetric encryption guarantees that the encryption of
two strings is indistinguishable, and further, an adversary (e.g. an eavesdropper in the communication
channel between buyer and sellers) cannot distinguish the ciphertext of m0,m1 chosen by her in any
case.
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Definition A.1. indistinguishability under chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CPA)
Let E = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a symmetric encryption scheme, and let A be an polynomial adversary
who has access to an oracle. On input (m0,m1), LR(⋅, ⋅, b) responds with Enck(mb). We consider
the following two experiments:
Expt0A ∶ k ← Gen(1n), b← ALR(⋅,⋅,0), return b
Expt1A ∶ k ← Gen(1n), b← ALR(⋅,⋅,1), return b
Then E is IND-CPA secure encryption scheme if
∣Pr[Expt0A = 1] −Pr[Expt1A = 1]∣ ≤ µ(n)
In the previous section 3.2 we introduce the definition of a encryption scheme. Here we provide
the encryption algorithm that is IND-CPA secure in Algorithm 1 and 2 [15].
Algorithm 1: Algorithm for encryption Enc.
Input: message m = (m1,m2, . . . ,mn), s.t. ∀i, ∣mi∣ = µ
k ← {0,1}κ, s.t. ∀i,H(isProgrammed, k∥i) ≠ 1
for i = 1 to n do
ki =H(k∥i)
Enc(m)i = ki ⊕mi
end
Output: Enc(m) = (Enc(m)1, . . . ,Enc(m)n)
Algorithm 2: Algorithm for decryption.
Input: ciphertext c = (c1, . . . , cn), s.t. ∣ci∣ = µ, and key k
for i← 1 to n do
ki =H(k∥i)
if H(isProgrammed, k∥i) then
Output: 
else
mi = ki ⊕ ci
end
end
Output: m = (m1,m2, . . . ,mn)
A.3 Commitment Scheme
Recall the definition of a commitment scheme in section 3.2. Here we provide the commitment
scheme used in our proof, contructed with the global random oracle.
Algorithm 3 shows that if Op(m) is long enough, the chance for A to distinguish Com(m1) and
Com(m2) is negligible. Thus the hiding property is guaranteed. Algorithm 4 shows how to open the
commitment. It is also hard to break the binding property, since H outputs uniformly distributed
random numbers.
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Algorithm 3: Algorithm for commitment Com.
Input: message m ∈ {0,1}∗
Op(m))← {0,1}κ, s.t. H(isProgrammed,m∥Op(m)) ≠ 1
Com(m)←H(m∥Op(m))
Output: (Com(m),Op(m))
Algorithm 4: Algorithm for opening commitment.
Input: Com(m), Op(m)
if Com(m) =H(m∥Op(m)) and H(isProgrammed,m∥Op(m)) = 0 then
Output: 1
else
Output: 0
end
A.4 Security definition: simulation for semi-honest adversaries
Simulation is a way of comparing what happens in the “real world” to what happens in an “ideal
world”. The “ideal world” is usually secure by definition. For any adversary in real world, if there
exists a simulator in ideal world who can achieve almost the same attack as adversary in real world,
then the protocol is said to be secure.
We start to formally define security in the presence of semi-honest, “honest-but-curious”, adver-
saries, i.e. the definition of t-private [3]. At a high level, a protocol is t-private if the view of up to t
corrupted parties in a real protocol execution can be generated by a simulator.
For a protocol Π, the view of the each party i, viewΠi (x) is defined as her inputs, internal coin
tosses and the messages she receives during an execution of a protocol Π(x). For each subset of
parties I, viewΠI is defined as the union views of all parties in I.
Definition A.2 (t-privacy of m-party protocols [3]). Let f be a a probabilistic m-ary functionality
that maps m inputs to m outputs, i.e., ({0, 1}∗)m ↦ ({0, 1}∗)m and let Π be a protocol. Π is t-private
for f if for every I ⊂ [m] of cardinality at most t, Π is I-private for f in the sense that there exists
a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm sim such that for every input x it holds that:
Privacy: sim(security parameter, I’s inputs and outputs) is computationally indistinguishable with
I’s views in protocol Π given input x, i.e., viewΠI (x);
Correctness: when f is a deterministic function, f(x) equals Π’s output outputΠ(x), when f is a
probabilistic function, f(x)’s distribution equals outputΠ(x)’s distribution.
Π is full-private for f when Π is m-private for f .
We introduce a common technique, sequential composition, in security proof that will simplify
the proof substantially. Informally, it says that if a protocol Π’s sub-protocols are secure and satisfy
a “sequential and isolated” condition, the protocol Π is secure as well.
Lemma A.3 (Sequential Composition[10]). Let gi denote ideal functionality, and let Πρ1,...4 denote
the real world protocol such that 1) sub-protocol ρ1, ... are called sequentially, 2) no Π-messages sent
4Πρ1,...,ρn denotes a protocol Π which calls ideal functionality ρ1, ...ρn during its execution.
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while ρ1, ... are executed. If Πg1,... is a secure hybrid world protocol computing f and each ρi securely
computes gi, then Πρ1,... is a secure real-world protocol computing f .
B Formal security proof
We present our formal security proof here. Note that SMind motivates all traders to behave honestly.
Thus, we only define and prove the security against semi-honest, i.e., “honest-but-curious”, adversaries.
We will first give the definition of an ideal ITP which is secure by definition and then show that
there exists simulators that can simulate SMind only with views from the ideal ITP, which implies
that SMind is secure, as SMind reveals no more information than the ideal ITP.
For simplicity of the proof, we employ the sequential composition technique here and first consider
a middle protocol Π. We define protocol Π as the protocol that is the same as SMind except the
Compute Payment Function stage. In Π’s Compute Payment Function stage, the sellers submit
their infos to a trusted center M and M finishes the payment computation privately and reveals
the output publicly. Thus, Π replaces the MPC session in SMind by a trusted center. We will show
that Π is computationally indistinguishable with the ideal world. Then according to Lemma A.3
and Lemma 3.6, SMind is also computationally indistinguishable with the ideal world.
Definition B.1 (Ideal ITP). An ideal ITP’s functionality:
Sign Contract Upon receiving deposits and the consistent payment functions from the traders,
reveals the contract publicly.
Assign Questions Upon receiving question set Q from buyer, generates two random orders pi1, pi2
and sends pii(Q) to each seller Si privately.
Submit Answers Waits for the sellers to finish the questions and collects each seller’s info privately.
Compute Payment Function Upon receiving infoi from two sellers, computes PayFunc, and
reveals the output to public.
Make Transactions Sends infos to the buyer and makes transactions based on the contract.
Definition B.2 (Security ITP (formal)). An ITP is secure if the ITP fulfills the ideal ITP’s
functionality, and in every stage, ITP is full-private for ideal ITP.
We start to show the middle protocol Π is secure by enumerating all possible subsets I and show
that Π is I-private for ideal ITP in every stage.
Notations We use the subscript of protocol Π to denote the stages Π is in. For instance, Πs−c
represents the protocol execution from Sign Contract stage to Compute Payment Function stage.
When the real message is m, we sometimes use m⋀ to denote the simulated m. For instance, we use
Com(m)⋀to denote the simulation of Com(m). Although Com(m)⋀has m, Com(m)⋀is usually a random
string that is generated independent of m, i.e., without the knowledge of m.
In the simulation, we assume the simulator in the ideal world can simulate the smart contract
internally. The simulation for smart contract is very similar with [15] and we omit the detailed
description of the simulation in our proof.
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B.1 Security against the smart contract/public: SC-private
Before the Compute Payment Function stage, the public’s view in Π is
viewΠs−cSC = ({Com(pii(Q)),Com(Encinfo-keyi(infoi)),Com(info-keyi)∣i = 1,2})
However, in ideal world, a smart contract neither sends nor receives message from the ideal function-
ality.
At a high level, the simulator can replace infoi by garbages, generate keys, openings and then
simulate the above view accordingly. In detail, The simulator can simulate the view by generating
random info-keyi
⋀
,Op(info-keyi)⋀, i = 1,2 and then outputting
{(Com(pii(Q))⋀,Com(Encinfo-keyi⋀(1∣infoi∣)),Com(info-keyi⋀)∣i = 1,2})
to simulate viewΠs−cSC respectively, where Com(pii(Q)) denotes the simulated commitment for question
set. But in fact, Com(pii(Q))⋀is a random string that is generated without the knowledge of pii(Q).
Since both our commitment scheme is constructed based on the global random oracle, the output
of the simulator is computationally indistinguishable with the real view, only except a negligible
probability, according to the property of the global random oracle.
In the Compute Payment Function stage, the public additionally views the output of the payment
function while the simulator is also given this output in the ideal world.
After the Open and Check Goods stage, the public in Π additionally has
{(Op(info-keyi), info-keyi)∣i = 1,2}.
The simulator can reveal the previously used
{(Op(info-keyi)⋀, info-keyi⋀)∣i = 1,2}
without being distinguished since it is consistent with the simulator’s previous output.
B.2 Security against the buyer: B-private
Before the Open and Check Goods stage, the buyer’s view in Π is
viewΠs−cB = (Q,{pii,Op(pii(Q)),Encinfo-keyi(infoi),Op(Encinfo-keyi(infoi)),Com(info-keyi)∣i = 1,2}).
We start to construct the simulator simB to simulate the buyer’s view with only the input
message Q and security parameter.
simB will first generates two random orders pi1⋀, pi2⋀ and four randomness
Op(pii(Q))⋀,Op(Encinfo-keyi(infoi))⋀, i = 1,2
as openings. Note here we do not need to know the message to generate its opening since we just use
Op(m) to denote the opening for m’s commitment and in fact, the randomness Op(m) is independent
of m.
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Then simB generates four random strings Com(info-keyi)⋀, i = 1, 2, Encinfo-key1(infoi)⋀, i = 1, 2. The
four random strings are generated independently and uniform at random without any knowledge of
infos or info-keys. We will use the programmability of our global random oracle to program these four
random strings such that they will correspond to future revealed real info-keys and infos (Section A.1).
Since both our commitment scheme and encryption scheme are constructed based on the global
random oracle, the output of simB is computationally indistinguishable with viewΠB , only except a
negligible probability, according to the property of the global random oracle.
After the Open and Check Goods stage, the buyer’s view in Π additionally has
viewΠoB = {(Op(info-keyi), info-keyi)∣i = 1,2}.
In the ideal world, the simulator simB will know infos in this stage. To simulate the view in Π,
we construct info-keys info-keyi
⋀
, i = 1,2 and employ the the programmability of the global random
oracle (Section A.1) such that the previously generated garbage Encinfo-keyi(infoi)⋀, i = 1,2 can be
decrypted to real infos and the previously committed garbage Com(info-keyi)⋀, i = 1, 2 can be opened as
info-keyi
⋀
, i = 1, 2, with openings Op(info-keyi)⋀. Then the simulator outputs (Op(info-keyi)⋀, info-keyi⋀).
Based on the construction of the outputs, these outputs are indistinguishable with the buyer’s real
view in Π since both of them are consistent with the previous views in their worlds respectively.
B.3 Security against one seller: Si-private
Before the Compute Payment Function stage, each seller i’s view is
viewΠs−sSi =(pii(Q),Op(pii(Q)),Com(pi1(Q)),Com(pi2(Q)), infoi,
Op(Encinfo-keyi(infoi)), info-keyi,Op(info-keyi),
Com(info-key−i),Com(Encinfo-keyi(info−i)))
In this stage, simSi is given pii(Q), infoi. The simulator will simulate the view by using the given
inputs and additionally generating several independent random strings to simulate other information
(we still add wide hat to the real views to denote the simulated ones), which is computationally
indistinguishable with the real world view only except a negligible probability, according to the
property of the global random oracle.
In the Compute Payment Function stage, the seller will additionally view the output of the
payment function, which is also viewed by the simulator in the ideal world. Thus, the seller’s view
can still be simulated here.
After the Open and Check Goods stage, the seller i needs to submit info-keyi and Op(info-keyi)
and additionally view (Op(info-key−i), info-key−i)
In the ideal world, the simulator simSi does not gain additional knowledge as the trusted center only
sends the infos to the buyer. But the simulator can still simulate the additional view by employing
the the programmability of the global random oracle and output (Op(info-key−i)⋀, info-key−i⋀) that
are consistent with previously outputted Com(info-key−i)⋀.
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B.4 Security against two sellers: {S1,S2}-private
Before the Compute Payment Function stage, two sellers’ view is
(viewΠs−sS1 ,viewΠs−sS2 )
Similar with the one seller setting, the simulator simS1,S2 is given pii(Q), infoi, i = 1,2 and can
simulate other information in real views by generate several independent random strings. The
Compute Payment Function stage’s simulation is also the same as the one seller case. From now,
since all traders are semi-honest, the protocol will finish in the Open and Check Goods stage and
the two sellers will not observe new information. Thus, the simulation is finished.
B.5 Security against the buyer and one seller: {B,Si}-private
Before the Compute Payment Function stage, the buyer and one sellers’ view in Π is
viewΠs−sB,Si =(Q,pi1, pi2,Op(pi1(Q)),Op(pi2(Q)), infoi,Op(Encinfo-keyi(infoi)), info-keyi,Op(info-keyi)
Op(info-key−i),Encinfo-key−i(info−i),Op(Encinfo-key−i(info−i)),Com(info-key−i)).
In this stage, the simulator is given Q,pii(Q), infoi in the ideal world. Still the simulator can
simulate the view by generating a random order pi−i and several independent random strings, without
being distinguished, according to the property of commitment scheme and global random oracle.
In the Compute Payment Function stage, the buyer and seller i will additionally know the output
of the payment function, which is also learned by the simulator in the ideal world.
After the Open and Check Goods stage, the buyer and seller i additionally view
(Op(info-key−i), info-key−i)
In the ideal world, the simulator is given info−i. Similar with the single buyer setting, the simu-
lator can simulate the additional view by employing the the programmability of the global ran-
dom oracle and output (Op(info-key−i)⋀, info-key−i⋀) that are consistent with previously outputted
Encinfo-key−i(info−i)⋀,Com(info-key−i).
B.6 Security against buyer and two sellers: {B,S1,S2}-private
This case is a trivial simulation since the simulator knows all information when adversaries are
semi-honest. For completeness, we still present the simulation here.
Before the Compute Payment Function stage, the buyer and two sellers’ view in Π is
viewΠs−sB,S1,S2 =(Q,{pii,Op(pii(Q)), infoi,Op(Encinfo-keyi(infoi)),
info-keyi,Op(info-keyi)∣i = 1,2}).
In this stage, simB,S1,S2 are given (Q,pii, infoi, i = 1,2). Then the simulator will generate other
information easily as SMind described.
In the payment computation stage, all traders will additionally view the output of the payment
function, which is also viewed by the simulator in the ideal world. Thus, all traders’ view can still be
simulated. From now, all traders will not observe new information. Thus, the simulation is finished.
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Thus, we have proved that Π is secure. Based on the sequential composition technique
(Lemma A.3) and the fact that MPC is secure (Lemma 3.6), we finish the formal security proof of
SMind.
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